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Abstract
This paper develops a new methodology to estimate the e ect of low-wage import competition
on U.S. producer prices. We  rst document that when low-wage countries grow, their exports
to the United States increase most in labor-intensive sectors. Second, we demonstrate that the
temporary and relative component of imports induced by labor intensity and output growth
in low-wage countries is orthogonal to U.S. supply and demand shocks and can, therefore, be
utilized to identify the causal impact of import competition on prices. In a panel covering 325
manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006, we  nd that imports from nine low-wage countries
are associated with strong downward pressure on U.S. prices. When these nations capture 1%
U.S. market share, producer prices decrease by 3.1%, which is nearly fully accounted by a 2.4%
increase in labor productivity and a 0.4% decrease in markups. Overall, we  nd that imports
from the examined countries have decreased U.S. manufacturing PPI in ation by around two
percentage points each year.
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1Have cheap imports from low-income, low-wage nations held down in ationary pressure in rich
economies? Contrary to what customers at Wal-Mart, Toys"R"Us, or Best Buy observe every
day, the academic literature has found surprisingly little evidence that trade with China and other
poor, yet rapidly industrializing nations, has had a large impact on prices in the rest of the world.
Due to the paucity of one-time tari  reductions that could be utilized to establish the impact
of low-wage country (LWC) import competition, a large part of the current literature relies on
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates.1 For example, studies by Ball (2006), Feyzioglu and
Willard (2008), Gamber and Hung (2001), Ihrig et al. (2007), Kamin et al. (2006), Pain et
al. (2006), or Tootell (1998) evaluating the e ect of low-wage imports on U.S. prices cannot
disentangle U.S. demand shocks from supply shocks abroad and, therefore, cannot identify the
e ect of import competition on in ationary pressure in the United States.2
This paper is the  rst study identifying the causal e ect of import competition from the major
low-wage economies on in ationary pressure in the U.S. A wide literature, including Tre er (1993
and 1995), Davis and Weinstein (2001), Romalis (2004), and Chor (2008), has documented that
labor abundant countries have a comparative advantage in labor intensive sectors. The starting
observation of this paper is that the relation between comparative advantage and imports also
holds at the margin: if the aggregate industrial output of a LWC grows, exports to the United
States increase much more in labor intensive sectors than in capital intensive sectors. Below, we
show how these marginal trade  ows induced by comparative advantage can identify the e ect of
LWC imports on U.S. industry.
Our study draws upon the work of Bernard et al. (2006), who utilize variation in sectoral
import shares to identify the e ect of low-wage import competition on U.S.  rm entry and exit
dynamics. As these authors are well aware, sectoral import shares themselves are endogenous
to U.S. demand and they, therefore, use ad valorem tari s, freight rates, and lagged import
1W ea r en o ta w a r eo fo n e - t i m ee v e n t st h a ti n d u c e das i z e a b l ei n c r e a s ei ni m p o r t sf r o mt h e s en a t i o n s .F o re x a m p l e ,
China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 reduced average tari s by less than two percentage points. Although the
accession of Mexico to NAFTA had a sizeable e ect on Mexico (see Hanson (2003)), the increase of Mexican imports
did not a ect the United States to an extent measurable in nationwide data.
2Studies focusing on in ation that  nd a muted or no e ect of LWC import competition - including Ball (2006),
Ihrig et al. (2007), Pain et al. (2006), and Tootell (1998) - use conventional speci cations of the Phillips curve
to determine the role of foreign output gaps or import prices on domestic in ation. Feyzioglu and Willard (2008),
Gamber and Hung (2001), and Kamin et al. (2006) focus on the e ect of the share of imports originating from
LWCs on in ationary pressure.
2shares to instrument for these trade  ows. A related strategy has been employed by Chen et al.
(2007), who identify the pro-competitive e ect of trade within a set of eight European nations.
The latter authors instrument for trade with transportation costs, Hummels’ (2001) measure of
good bulkiness, and a measure of the geographic potential for trade derived from a gravity-type
equation.3
The main novelty of our empirical strategy is to construct an instrument for trade that is
directly based on comparative advantage. The obvious motive of doing so is that comparative
advantage can explain a large fraction of trade between nations at di erent stages of development,
such as the United States and the newly industrialized world. This is especially important since
our analysis is in  rst di erences: while the instruments used in the current literature display
little variation over time, the instrumentation strategy of this paper can also predict marginal
trade  ows at very high levels of signi cance.
More importantly, as demonstrated by Bernard et al. (2007), trade motivated by comparative
advantage has macroeconomic implications di erent from the ones when trade is induced by
motives such as transportation costs. We believe that researchers and policy makers alike are
primarily interested in understanding to what extent low wages in China and the other emerging
economies have translated into lower U.S. prices of labor intensive imports and, consequently,
into lower U.S. in ationary pressure. Since we isolate exclusively the component of trade that
is motivated by low wages, our strategy is well-suited to analyze the impact of low-wage import
competition on U.S. prices.
Our analysis proceeds in three stages. In the  rst part, we describe the evolution of imports
from nine low-wage economies from 1997 to 2006. The comparative advantage of these nations
is in labor intensive sectors. The composition of imports has remained remarkably stable over
the last decade, while trade volume grew strongly. Consequently, U.S. import competition has
increased mostly in labor intensive sectors. We then show that the relative increase of import
competition in labor intensive sectors was most pronounced in the years when the growth of
industrial output in the emerging economies was highest. More speci cally, we document that the
3Glatzer et al (2006), IMF(2006), and Wheeler (2008) apply the empricial strategy by Chen et al. (2007) for
Austria, OECD countries, and the United Kingdom, respectively.
3interaction of a sector’s labor intensity and the growth rate of industrial output in the examined
economies can predict changes in U.S. import competition. We refer to the component of trade
that can be explained by this interaction as the "comparative advantage-induced" trade  ows.
In the second part of the analysis, we develop an empirical framework to identify how com-
parative advantage-induced trade  ows have a ected prices in the United States. Our analysis
includes  xed e ects by sectors and year dummies. Since the analysis below is in  rst di erences,
all sector-speci c structural trends in prices or import volumes are thus captured in the sector
dummies. Due to the additional presence of year dummies, all shocks we identify are relative
shocks, i.e., we relate relative changes in import competition to changes in relative prices.
Before turning to our results, we test whether our strategy is well-suited to examine the causal
impact of import competiton. A potential concern with our analysis is that even temporary U.S.
shifts into capital intensive sectors could result in both increasing imports concentrated in labor
intensive sectors and aggregate output growth in low-wage economies. While we do not observe
U.S. demand and supply shocks directly, these alter the level of U.S. consumption, U.S. production,
and U.S. non-LWC imports, which are all observable. We thus demonstrate that the relative and
temporary component of comparative advantage-induced trade  ows is orthogonal to structural
shifts in the United States. We also highlight the large potential bias in OLS estimates.
In the third part of the analysis, we present the results of this study. Low-wage import
competition has had a profound impact on U.S. relative producer prices.4 The two-stage least
squares estimates reveal a strong negative relationship between changes in LWC import share and
changes in U.S. producer prices. We  nd that when our nine LWCs capture 1% market share in
a sector, U.S. producer prices decrease between 2% and 3%. This result stands in stark contrast
to OLS estimates predicting an insigni cant and often positive correlation between these two
variables.
We next decompose the price-dampening e ect into the contribution of labor productivity
growth, markup reductions, and input cost  uctuations. Surprisingly, we  nd that the dominant
channel through which LWCs have a ected U.S. industry is by inducing sectoral productivity
4We do not analyze the direct e ect of changes in import competition on U.S. import prices since the latter
are not available on a bilateral basis and, furthermore, aggregate import price data are available only for a small
number of sectors.
4growth, as predicted by Melitz (2003) and, in particular, Bernard et al. (2007). In our estimations,
a one percentage-point increase in the U.S. market share of LWC imports is associated with an
increase of labor productivity of about two percentage points. Further corroborating the evidence
in favor of the "new" new theories of trade, we also document that the response of prices and
productivity to import competition is systematically related to the elasticity of demand. While
the response of import  ows to growth in LWCs is much more pronounced in sectors with elastic
demand, the response of prices and productivity to a given increase of import competition is
higher in sectors with inelastic demand.
We next analyze whether LWC import competition has a ected the cost of production. We
do not  nd any evidence of a negative e ect of LWCs on the wages of unskilled workers. However,
given the di erence-in-di erence setup, our approach can only detect whether import competition
causes sectoral variation in wages, yet not whether import competition in general has depressed
wages. Last, we investigate whether low-cost intermediate goods lower U.S. prices relying on the
measure of input intensity developed by Schott (2004). We do not  nd that cheap imported input
goods can explain lower U.S. prices.
The conclusion of this paper is that globalization has had a profound impact on U.S. relative
prices and productivity, much larger than is commonly assumed. Our results, however, should
be interpreted with care when making statements about the aggregate e ect of LWCs on U.S.
in ationary pressure. We estimate the e ect on relative prices, and due to the di erence-in-
di erence type identi cation, our methodology abstracts from factors such as the increase in
global raw material prices that growth in LWCs has brought about or the optimal response of
central banks to relative price shocks. Given these limitations, a rough estimate is that from 1997
to 2006, the U.S. PPI in ation rate in the manufacturing sector was reduced due to the trade
with LWCs by about two percentage points each year, while productivity growth was increased
by one to two percentage points in the sectors examined in this paper. China accounts for over
o n eh a l fo ft h et o t a le   e c t .
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the data, the evolution of low-wage
import competition over time, and documents that marginal imports from LWCs can be ex-
plained by comparative advantage. Section 2 lays down the empirical framework and discusses
5the identifying assumption. Section 3 presents the empirical results. Section 4 decomposes the
price change into the contributions of productivity growth, markup declines, and costs reductions.
Section 5 analyses the impact of the elasticity of demand on the response of U.S. prices on import
competition. Section 6 concludes.
1 Comparative Advantage and the Evolution of LWC Imports
In this section, we describe the evolution of U.S. imports from China, Brazil, Indonesia, India,
Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.5 While the overall volume of imports
from these nations grew substantially over the last decade, the composition of these imports has
been fairly stable over this period. We next document that static comparative advantage and the
growth rate of industrial output in LWCs can explain marginal trade  ows, i.e., changes in import
competition.
1.1 Data Description
We use sectoral and annual trade data from the United States International Trade Commission
(USITC), covering the 1997-2006 period. The classi cation of the import data is 6-digit North
American Industry Classi cation System (NAICS) and the selected trade type is the General
Customs value.6 U.S. data on wages, producer prices, and productivity (4- to 6-digits) are from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).7 Information to construct sectoral markups were taken from
the Annual Survey of Manufactures, see Appendix A for the respective de nition of variables. The
overlap of industry information from the Annual Survey of Manufacturers and the price data from
the BLS yields 325 di erent sectors (NAICS codes 311111 to 339999).
Our measure of import penetration is constructed in the following way.
De nition 1 (Low-Wage Import Competition). Denote low-wage import competition in sector 
5Appendix C explains our sampling criterion in selecting these nine LWCs.
6The General Customs value is appraised by the U.S. Customs Service and is the price paid or payable for
merchandise when sold for exportation, excluding U.S. import duties, freight, insurance, and other changes incurred.
7The BLS publishes only 4-digit data on its website. Additional data were obtained through private correspon-
dence.








Value World Imports + Value Domestic Shipments
¢
We follow Bernard et al. (2006) in de ning low-wage import competition as the expenditure
share of imports from the nine LWCs divided by total U.S. sales. U.S. sales equal the sum of
world imports plus domestic shipments. To make sure that our results are not driven by the
endogenous response of U.S. sales to U.S. demand, the value of domestic shipments plus world
i m p o r t si sa v e r a g e do v e rt h e10 years in our sample.8 Our measure of import penetration takes
the value of 001 in a sector where imports from the country in question amount to 1% of average
U.S. sales in the respective sector.
In most of the analysis below, we evaluate absolute changes in import penetration. All changes
in variables are denoted by  ,i . e . ,  =   1. This strategy is expedient
since the response of U.S. prices should be related to the increase of imports normalized by U.S.
demand rather than related to the percentage increase of imports. Further, evaluating absolute
growth rather than the relative (percentage) growth of imports does not force us to drop any
zero-trade observations.
To measure an industry’s labor intensity, we use information from the Annual Survey of
Manufacturers. Labor share is de ned as the 1997 to 2006 average of the U.S. labor expenditure
share for each of the 325 sectors. The labor expenditure share equals expenditures for labor
divided by the total expenditure for labor and capital. Because we exclude expenditures for
inputs, energy, and transportation, the average labor share is rather high at 85% (69% when
weighted by total import volume). Only taking into account labor and capital expenditures,
however, leads to a clear measure of labor versus capital intensity.
8Due to this averaging, LWC import share could theoretically exceed 100% towards the end of the sampling
period. This is never the case in any of the 325 industries. The Annual Survey of Manufacturing does not report
U.S. domestic shipments for all years and all industries. Whenever the value of domestic shipment is missing, we
then average over the available values and use the resulting measure over the entire sampling length.
71.2 LWC Import Competition Over Time
As shown in Figure 1, in 2006, the nine examined LWCs accounted for imports worth more than
55% of U.S. GDP, equivalent to roughly 600 billion dollars or one-third of total U.S. imports.
Even more impressive is the growth rate of trade with this group of countries: in 1997,t h e y
accounted for imports worth a mere 25% of U.S. GDP.
In which sectors is import competition from China and the other countries of this study most
intense? Has the composition of these imports changed over time? Figure 2 documents that
low-wage import competition is concentrated in labor intensive sectors. The upper scatter plot
of Figure 2 relates the volume of U.S. imports from the nine LWCs normalized by U.S. sales
in 1997 to the sector’s labor intensity. Labor intensity is de ned as the ratio of the 1997 to
2006 average of labor expenditures over labor plus capital expenditures. Due to the averaging,
a sector’s labor intensity is constant through time. In 1997, imports were concentrated in labor-
intensive industries. The lower scatter plot of Figure 2 documents that this relationship is even
more pronounced in 2006. In terms of changes, the two scatter plots of Figure 2 also imply that
the increase in import competition was concentrated in labor-intensive sectors.
How did the composition of imports from low-wage countries evolve over time? In Figure 3,
we describe the evolution of the average labor intensity of U.S. imports originating from China,
Mexico, the other seven low-wage countries (Brazil, India Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,
Thailand, and Vietnam), and from the rest of the world.9
China’s imports are by far the most labor intensive. The labor intensity of China’s imports has
remained remarkably stable through 1997 to 2006. In this period, the labor intensity decreased
only slightly from 82.9 to 81.5 percent. In contrast, the labor intensity of imports from Mexico
and the group of seven other low-wage economies increased over the last decade. For the case
of Mexico, this increase was quite pronounced, with average labor intensity going from 66.8% in
1997 to 70.9% in 2006. Most likely, this patter can be explained by Mexico’s participation in
NAFTA.
9The measure of average labor intensity of imports is constructed in the following way. A sector’s labor intensity
 is the sector’s U.S. labor intensity averaged over the 10 years of the sample. For every year, we then calculate 











8In stark contrast to the conventional wisdom that China and other emerging economies have
diversi ed and switched towards production of more sophisticated goods (see Schott (2004)), we
 nd that the composition of China’s exports has remained remarkably stable, while the capital
content of imports from the other LWCs has even decreased from 1997 to 2006. In Figure 4, we
provide an explanation for this  nding. Figure 4 depicts the growth of the capital stock and the
growth rate of e ective workers in China from 1996 to 2004. The number of e ective workers
equals the number of workers adjusted for the growth of labor productivity. E ective labor and
capital grew at a nearly identical pace, implying that China manly became a larger economy, but
did not becoming more capital intensive. Consequently, also the composition of its exports has
remained relatively stable.
Together, Figures 1 and 3 imply the following. During 1997 to 2006, the total volume of low-
wage imports has nearly tripled in volume and has more than doubled as a share of U.S. GDP. The
composition of U.S. imports from these imports has remained nearly unchanged (maybe with the
exception of Mexico, which has even specialized into more labor intensive goods). Consequently,
the increase in import competition in the decade leading up to 2006 was concentrated in sectors
where the nine LWCs already had a comparative advantage in 1997.
1.3 Factor Intensity, LWC Growth, and Import Competition
We next document that the interaction of a sector’s labor intensity and the growth rate of indus-
trial output in LWCs can explain changes in U.S. low-wage import competition.
In all estimations of Table 1, the dependent variable is the absolute year-to-year change of
import competition from a selected country. For example, in Column (1), the dependent variable
is the absolute change of imports from China divided by the size of the respective sector in the
United States. The U.S. sector size is de ned as the value of domestic shipments plus the values
of imports from all countries.
In the random e ects model of Column (1), the independent variables are the growth of
industrial output in China, the sectoral labor expenditure share, and the interaction of the two
(	
). The coe cient of  is estimated at +0665 a n di sh i g h l ys i g n i   c a n t ;t h a ti s ,
when China’s industrial capacity grows, exports to the United States increases in labor-intensive
9sectors. In contrast, the main e ect of industrial growth is estimated to be negative at 0445.
The main and interaction coe cients imply that if the growth rate of Chinese industrial output
is 1%, the value of U.S. imports in an industry 	 with a labor expenditure share of 
 =0 5
decreases by (1
206650445)001 or 011 percentage points. For the same 1% change in Chinese
output, U.S. imports in an industry  using only labor ( =1 )i n c r e a s eb y(06650445)001
or 022 percentage points. The unweighted average labor intensity in the sample is 085,s ot h a t
the average sector will capture an import share of 012 percentage points when China’s aggregate
manufacturing output grows by 1%.
In Column (2), we next add  xed e ects to the estimation in order to  lter out sectoral trends.
Because the labor share is averaged over time and does not vary within a sector, it is dropped
from the estimation. Next, in Column (3), we also add time dummies to the estimation. Because
the growth of industrial production in China is an aggregate variable, this regressor is dropped
from the estimation when time dummies are introduced.
Columns (4) to (6) repeat the speci cation of Column (3) for imports from Mexico, India,
and Vietnam. In these speci cations and in the rest of the paper, we include time dummies and
 xed e ects so that the labor share and the aggregate growth rate of these countries are dropped
from the estimations. The coe cients for growth interacted with labor intensity are positive and
signi cant. The coe cients are smaller re ecting the fact that these economies are smaller than
the Chinese economy.
We next turn to two falsi cation exercises that are particularly important in the context of
the identi cation restriction made in the next section. The fact that imports grew particularly
in labor-intensive sectors may also be the result of U.S. demand shocks that are biased towards
labor-intensive goods. As a  rst falsi cation exercise, we next repeat the analysis for Canada and
Japan in Columns (7) and (8). We  nd that labor share multiplied by manufacturing growth in
the two countries is not signi cantly correlated with changes in import share.
As a further counterfactual, we instrument for Japanese trade with Japanese growth interacted
with skill intensity. The measure of skill intensity is constructed by averaging the U.S. share of
non-production workers of total employees averaged over 1997 to 2006. While this measure can
predict changes of imports from Japan (see Column (9)), it fails to predict imports from China
10(see Column (10)).
Table 1 documents that there is a systematic relationship between the changes in U.S. imports,
growth, and comparative advantage. When labor-abundant LWCs grow, their exports increase
much more in labor-intensive sectors than in capital-intensive sectors. When a skill abundant
nation such as Japan grows, its exports increase in skill-intensive sectors, yet not in labor-intensive
ones.
2 Identifying the Causal E ect of LWC Imports
2.1 Identi cation Analysis
It is evident that trade is endogenous to global demand and supply conditions. In this section, we
lay out our strategy to instrument for trade  ows with those induced by the growth of aggregate
productive capacity in LWCs interacted with labor intensity. The exhibition in this section is
conducted for prices, but the analysis applies equally to productivity.
We begin with the true relationship between trade and prices. Denote U.S. prices at time 
for sector  by 
, and sectoral U.S. imports from LWCs normalized by the U.S. sector size by
. Denote the industry-speci c trend of U.S. prices in sector  by ,t h ec o m m o ns h o c k
to U.S. prices at time  by , and sector-speci c price shocks by . In the United States, the
true relationship between price changes and the changes of import competition is given by
 
 =  + 
  +  +  +  (1)
  =  +  
 +   +  +  (2)
In Equation (1), the coe cient of interest is 
, measuring the true impact of an increase in imports
from LWCs on sectoral prices. A prior shared by most researchers is that LWC imports lower
U.S. prices, i.e., 
0. Imports, however, also respond to U.S. demand conditions. Apart from
the unobserved export supply shocks in LWCs (denoted by  ), U.S. prices also in uence
how much foreign  rms export. Finally,  is an industry-speci c trend of LWC imports, 
is a common shock to exports to the United States, and  is a sector-speci c shock.
11When prices in the United States rise, imports from LWCs most likely increase. Therefore,
an OLS estimation of 
 in Equation (1) is biased and the true e ect of LWC imports is either
underestimated or estimated with the wrong sign. We thus instead focus on a driver of export
supply shocks in LWCs,  .
We denote the growth of industrial output in LWCs by  and a sector’s time-invariant labor
intensity by .
De nition 2 (Comparative Advantage-Induced Imports). Denote the element of the change of
import volume that can be explained by the sectoral trend , the aggregate growth rate ,
and the interaction of output growth and labor intensity  by  . By de nition,
  =  + c 1 + c 2 +  +  (3)
The main element of interest in (3) is , the weighted growth rate of LWC industrial
output interacted with sectoral labor intensity. This variable is constructed in the following
way. We  rst generate one weight for each LWC country  by averaging (imports from country 
/(U.S. domestic shipments + total imports)) over the 325 sectors and over the 10 years. We then
construct the weighted growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs by summing over
the growth rates multiplied by the country weight. Finally, we multiply the weighted growth rate
by the 1997 to 2006 average U.S. labor expenditure share of sector . Since the labor share varies
over industries and the growth rate over time, the instrument varies across both time and sectors.
Since aggregate growth in LWCs may be correlated with aggregate demand in the United
States, we do not directly use   to instrument for trade. Rather, we evaluate the di erence































The reduced-form relationship between labor intensity di erentials and price di erentials is de-
12rived by substituting Equation (5) into a di erence-in-di erence version of Equation (2). The
reduced-form di erence-in-di erence speci cation relating low-wage output growth changes and











.B yc o n -
struction, the residuals of any regression are orthogonal to the dependent variables and thus, it is
always true that 

 is orthogonal to . Our methodology can therefore establish the true
e ect of LWC imports if the following condition holds.
Assumption 1. (Identi cation Restriction)
(  
)  (  
) (6)
It is important to note that the orthogonality assumption (6) does not rely on the absence of cap-
ital or skill-biased structural shifts in the U.S. economy, nor would it be invalidated if aggregate
transitory shocks in the United States did in uence growth in LWCs. Our identi cation assump-
tion is much milder and relies on transitory sector-speci c shocks in the United States being
orthogonal to the interaction of growth in low-wage economies and a sector’s labor intensity.
Temporary shocks in the large U.S. economy can be strong enough to a ect both trade volume
and growth in the rest of the world. Given our identi cation strategy, this would bias our results
if such shocks were systematically concentrated in labor intensive sectors when growth in low-
wage countries is high, and systematically concentrated in capital intensive sectors when growth
in low-wage countries is low.
We have already provided a  rst falsi cation exercise in the previous section, where we demon-
strated that marginal trade  ows from Japan and Canada cannot be explained by labor intensity
(but by skill intensity). Hence, it cannot be the case that demand in the United States was
systematically biased towards labor-intensive goods, which was also causing growth of industrial
output abroad. We next examine the orthogonality assumption (6) directly and also contrast our
empirical approach to OLS estimates.
132.2 Examining the Identi cation Restriction
There are three potential concerns with the validity of our identi cation assumption. First,
positive U.S. demand shocks concentrated in labor intensive sectors could cause an increase of
labor-intensive imports originating from low-wage countries and, thereby, also cause growth of
industrial output in these countries. Second, the same could happen following a shift of U.S.
production into capital-intensive sectors. Third, also a shift of the export supply of other countries
away from labor-intensive sectors could induce both additional LWC imports in labor intensive
sectors and LWC growth. While such shocks are unobserved, they are correlated with changes in
U.S. consumption, U.S. production, and U.S. imports from non-LWCs, which are all observable.
We  rst examine the OLS relation between LWC imports and U.S. non-LWC consumption,
de ned as the sum of domestically produced goods plus imports from countries other than the nine
low-wage countries. If LWC imports increase following a supply shock in LWCs, LWC imports
should crowd out U.S. production and imports from the rest of the world, i.e., one should  nd
a negative correlation between LWC imports and U.S. non-LWC consumption. In contrast, if
LWC imports increase following a U.S. demand shock, one should observe a positive correlation
between these two variables.
We start by documenting the bias of OLS estimates. In Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 (Panel A),
the independent variable is the year-to-year change in LWC imports. The dependent variable is the
year-to-year change in the value of domestic shipments plus imports from non-LWC countries.10
The change in U.S. consumption has a signi cant and positive coe cient, i.e., when imports
from LWCs increase, non-LWC consumption increases, too. The coe cient is estimated at 063,
suggesting that if in sector j LWC imports increase by one percent of the respective U.S. industry
size, total U.S. consumption in sector j increases by 163% of the industry size.
The positive correlation between non-LWC consumption and LWC imports could be a result
of sector-speci c structural trends or temporary aggregate shocks. It may be more reasonable
to assume that sector-speci c and temporary shocks to LWC imports are uncorrelated with U.S.
demand shocks. We document that this is not the case in Column 2, which adds  xed e ects
10In all speci cations of Table 2, in order to ensure comparability with the other estimations of our study, the
dependent variables are normalized by average U.S. industry size, de ned as 1997 to 2006 average of domestic
shipments plus world imports.
14by sector and year dummies. The coe cient of the change of non-LWC consumption decreases
somewhat, but is still positive, signi cant, and economically large.
Even temporary and sector-speci c shocks to LWC imports are positively correlated with
shocks to non-LWC consumption in the United States. This result suggests that the main force
driving LWC imports are shocks to U.S. demand rather than to LWC supply.
In contrast, in the instrumental variable estimation in Column 3, we document that the
component of LWC imports induced by comparative advantage and LWC-growth is not positively
correlated with U.S. consumption shocks. In the second-stage estimation in Panel A, we repeat the
speci cation of Column 2, but instrument for changes of LWC import volume with the comparative
advantage-induced component of trade. In the  rst-stage estimation in Panel B, the independent
variable is the interaction of labor intensity and LWC growth. Since the estimation includes year
dummies and sector  xed e ects, the two interacted variables are not included on their own.
Whereas the OLS correlation between LWC imports and non-LWC consumption is positive,
it is negative (but insigni cant) once we instrument for imports. The coe cient is estimated at
102, implying that when comparative advantage-induced LWC import competition increases,
consumption of non-LWC origin decreases to exactly o set the increase in LWC import compe-
tition. The fact that instrumented changes in LWC imports fully crowd out consumption from
other countries can only be explained by LWC supply shocks, rather than U.S. demand shocks,
causing comparative advantage-induced imports.
In the remainder of Table 2, we decompose this crowding out into the e ect on U.S. production
and on imports from the rest of the world. In Columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the
absolute change in U.S. domestic shipments. In both speci cations, the independent variable is the
change in import competition. While changes in import competition are positively correlated with
changes of U.S. shipments in the OLS regression in Column 4, they are negatively correlated in
the instrumental variable estimation in Column 5. The (insigni cant) point estimate of Column 5
suggests that when LWCs capture one percent market share in sector j, this is o set by a reduction
of domestic sales by 0.55 percentage points in the same sector.
A last potential concern we address is the presence of shocks to either U.S. import demand
(but not demand in general) or of shocks to export supply in the rest of the world. The latter
15shocks could shift U.S. non-LWC imports towards capital intensive goods, thereby causing both
additional LWC imports in labor intensive sectors and aggregate LWC growth. In Columns 6 and
7, the dependent variable is the absolute change in imports from countries other than the nine
LWCs. While we  nd that in the OLS estimation, the correlation of LWC imports and imports
from the rest of the world is signi cant and positive, the relation between these two variables is
negative when we instrument for trade  ows.
We conclude from these falsi cation exercises that, while there is strong evidence that LWC
imports are endogenous to U.S. demand shocks, the comparative advantage and growth-induced
component of imports is not endogenous to U.S. shocks once one adjusts for sectoral trends and
temporary aggregate shocks.11
3R e s u l t s
We next turn to our results and present OLS and two-stage least squares (IV) estimates for the
di erence-in-di erence form of Equation (4) relating price changes to changes in import shares.
We  rst explain our strategy and document the large di erence between OLS and IV estimates
in Table 3. We next present the robustness analysis in Table 4.
As has been argued by Iranzo and Ma (2006), Hanson and Robertson (2008), and others,
China may crowd out imports from other low-wage countries such as Mexico. In order to analyze
the overall e ect of LWC exposure on the United States, rather than the e ect of China’s imports
on U.S. prices compounded with a potential crowding-out channel, we analyze the block impact
of the nine countries together.
OLS and IV Estimates: U.S. Producer Prices
In all regressions of Table 3, the dependent variable in Panel A is the percentage change of
the U.S. producer price index for each 6-digit sector. All estimations of Table 3 include  xed
e ects by sector. We begin our discussion by  rst presenting OLS estimates of U.S. producer
11Technically, only shocks that are temporary, sector-speci c, speci c to goods originating from LWCs, and large
enough to spur aggregate growth in LWCs are consistent with the presented counterfactuals. We believe that it is
reasonable to assume that such shocks are absent or negligible in the data. It is noteworthy that if these shocks
matter in reality, our  ndings are biased towards underestimating the e ect of low-wage import competition on
U.S. prices, i.e., even if such shocks are present, we present a valid lower bound for the e ect of import competition
on U.S. prices.
16prices regressed on LWC import share. This empirical strategy relates our  ndings to the existing
literature and highlights the bias in OLS estimations.
Column (1) shows the OLS regression of the annual change in LWC import share on the change
of the logarithm of the U.S. producer price. The coe cient is estimated signi cant and positive,
suggesting that imports from low-wage countries tend to increase U.S. prices. Aggregate U.S. and
LWC shocks may be more endogenous than shocks at the sectoral level. We therefore introduce
the growth of low-income manufacturing output in Column (2). The coe cient remains positive,
but is no longer signi cant. Since variables other than low-income manufacturing may a ect U.S.
prices, we next introduce year dummies in Column (3).
Column (3) documents that even conditional on all aggregate information ( ltered by the year
dummies) and abstracting from sectoral trends ( ltered by the sector dummies), OLS estimations
predict that LWCs have no e ect on U.S. prices. While the coe cient is estimated negative, it is
far from signi cant and economically very small: the estimation in Column (3) predicts that even
if China and other LWCs were to capture 100% of a U.S. market, prices would decrease by only
0.9%.
In contrast, the estimated e ect of LWC imports is economically very sizeable and statisti-
cally signi cant when we instrument for the trade  ows with the comparative advantage-induced
component of trade. In Column (4), we do not introduce year dummies, but we again introduce
the weighted LWC growth rate of manufacturing output. Consider the  rst-stage estimation in
Panel B, Column (4). The main coe cient of the growth of manufacturing output in LWCs is
estimated at -0.675, while the interaction coe cient of manufacturing growth rate times labor
share is estimated at 1.07. If LWCs grow by one percentage point, the import share increases by
0395% in a sector using only labor, while the import share of a sector with labor expenditure
share of 05 decreases by 0171%.
Consider next the second-stage estimation in Panel A, Column (4). If LWCs grow, the import
share increases in labor-intensive sectors. This comparative advantage-induced component of
trade leads to a large downward pressure on prices: the coe cient is estimated at 3112%,
that is, a 1% increase in import market share reduces U.S. producer prices by more than three
percentage points.
17We next estimate the main speci cation including  xed e ects and year dummies in Column
(5). Because the manufacturing output growth rate is one aggregate number per year, it is
dropped from the estimation with year dummies. In the speci cation of Column (5), all sector
speci c averages and aggregate shocks are  ltered out. Again, we  nd that when imports from
LWCs increase by 1% of the U.S. sector size, prices decrease by around 3%.
Before turning to an explanation of why prices react so dramatically to foreign competition,
we  rst present some robustness tests in Table 4.
Robustness Analysis
The structure of Table 4 is the following. Panel A presents the OLS regressions. Panel B
presents the second-stage estimation relating instrumented trade  ows to changes in prices. Panel
C presents the  rst-stage estimation with changes of the LWC import share as the dependent
variable.
We start by adding the lagged level of LWC imports to the estimation. The lag speci cation
controls for the fact that the level of LWC imports might a ect prices, since existing imports
could become cheaper over time. The regression in Column 1 of Panel B shows that the (lag)
level of imports is not signi cant. Nevertheless, a high level of existing exports can further explain
increases in imports (Panel C, Column 1).
Prices might react to changes in imports with a lag, and prices might themselves mean revert.
We therefore include the lagged change in the import share in Column (2) and the lagged price
change in Column (3). Indeed, each of these two controls reduces the estimated coe cient for
the changes of imports somewhat, but the coe cient is still estimated above two and highly
signi cant. In Column (4), we control for productivity growth.
Our sample is characterized by a small number of observations with very large price movements
that might not be representative, since they are in raw material-intensive industries such as oil
re neries, copper wire, and petrochemical manufacturing where LWC imports do not have an
important impact on prices. We have thus excluded 35 NAICS-Year observations based on the
criterion that the absolute change in the logarithm of the price exceeded 0.25. The excluded
observations are listed in Appendix B. In Column (5), we include the 35 outliers to the estimation.
The estimated coe cient nearly doubles and is again highly signi cant.
18The Hecksher-Ohlin theory of trade and its modern extensions not only make predictions about
trade  ows, but also about net trade  ows (imports minus exports). We therefore instrument for
the change in net imports in Column (6). We  nd that also net trade  ows are well explained
by our instrumentation strategy and that comparative advantage-induced net imports have a
profound e ect on U.S. producer prices.
In Column (7), we analyze the special role of China. In Panel C, we instrument for the change
of Chinese imports with the growth of manufacturing production in China interacted with U.S.
labor intensity. The highly signi cant coe cient in Panel B suggests that Chinese exports have a
slightly stronger e ect on U.S. prices than imports from other LWCs (compare Column 5 of Table
3a n dC o l u m n7o fT a b l e4 ) .
Table 4 documents that our instrumentation strategy can predict changes in LWC imports
for a wide variety of speci cations. The same table also documents that the estimated e ect of
LWC trade on prices is statistically signi cant and economically large. In Panel A, we also show
that the OLS bias is sizeable for all speci cations. We next analyze the precise channels through
which trade has a ected prices.
4 Decomposing the Impact of Import Competition
The per unit cost of a good can be expressed as the product of the cost of all inputs used in the
production of the good divided by the productivity with which these inputs are used. A good’s
price can be expressed as the per unit cost of the good multiplied by (one plus the markup).
Hence, abstracting from aggregation issues, the percentage change of the sectoral average price
can be decomposed into the contribution of cost of input changes ( ), changes in productivity
( ), and changes in one plus the markup ( (1+))( a l w a y si n% ) :
 
 =      + ( 1+)
With this de-composition in mind, in this section, we set out to analyze why prices react so
strongly to import competition.
U.S. Labor Productivity
19To measure U.S. productivity growth, we use output per hour worked from the Annual Survey
of Manufacturers as the dependent variable. Table 5 repeats the basic speci cation of Column (5)
in Table 3 and the robustness tests of Table 4, but with productivity as the dependent variable.
Because the  rst stage is identical to that of Table 3, it is not reported. Panel A presents the
OLS results, while Panel B of Table 5 presents the two-stage least squares estimates.
In Column (1), we present the baseline estimation including only  xed e ects and year dum-
mies, and the interaction of LWC growth and labor intensity. A one percentage point increase in
i m p o r t si sa s s o c i a t e dw i t ha2375% increase in sectoral productivity. Hence, of the 31% total
percent price change, over three-fourths are explained by productivity growth.
In the robustness tests presented in Table 5, the magnitude of productivity changes is com-
parable to the baseline result of Column 1. It is economically large, but signi cant only in  ve of
the eight speci cations. The robustness tests are identical to those of Table 4, except in Column
5. Here, we add the lagged change of productivity rather than the contemporaneous change as a
control.
The IV regressions in Panel B again underscore the bias of OLS regressions in Panel A.
Although the coe cients for the e ect of imports on productivity in Panel A have the right sign
in seven out of eight cases, the magnitude of the coe cients in the OLS regression is around 0.4%,
or only one-sixth of the true e ect.
Wages and Input Costs
While productivity explains a large part of the price-dampening e ect of import competition,
costs might also be a ected by trade. In Table 6, we examine the e ect of imports on wages and
on the cost of input goods. We present the OLS estimations in Panel A, the instrumental variable
estimations in Panel B, and the  rst-stage estimations in Panel C.
In Columns (1) to (3), the dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the hourly
wage of production workers in each sector. Column (1) presents the baseline estimation, Column
(2) controls for U.S. productivity growth, and Column (3) controls for lagged changes of worker
wages. While the OLS regressions in Panel A suggest that competition from LWCs tends to
decrease the hourly wages of production workers, this is not supported by the IV estimations.
Rather, the coe cient of changes of the import share is estimated to be positive, although
20not statistically signi cant. A potential explanation for the positive correlation is that produc-
tivity increases considerably when import competition increases, therefore bene ting production
workers. This result, however, does not imply that low-skilled workers do not su er from import
competition: the absence of any industry-speci c e ect could also be the consequence of workers
being mobile across industries. As a result, di erences between sectors are non-responsive to
import competition.
While sector-speci c wages seem not to be a ected, low-cost imports might nevertheless a ect
the cost of production since they reduce the costs of inputs. In Column (4), we analyze the e ect
of imports on the change in the cost of materials purchased. The dependent variable is the change
in the logarithm of the cost of material divided by the value of shipments. Interestingly, although
far from signi cant, the ratio of the costs of inputs does drop considerably (see Panel B) when
imports from low-cost producers increase.
To further investigate the importance of input goods, we directly analyze whether the response
of prices to imports is di erent in sectors that contain more or less intermediate goods, inputs,
and parts. We construct a measure of input intensity following Schott (2004) and split the sample
into sectors that do or do not contain inputs.
Column (5) only includes 6-digit NAICS sectors that do not include 10-digit HS goods code
containing the words "Parts", "Input", or related abbreviations in the sector description. The
 rst stage is well identi ed and the e ect of imports on prices is estimated at -2.339, comparable
to our baseline estimate.
In the estimations of Columns (6) to (8), the sample is restricted to the 6-digit NAICS sectors
that include at least one 10-digit HS sector with "Parts", "Input", or related abbreviations in the
sector description and a non-zero trade  ow. In the OLS regressions of Panel A, the response of
prices in the sector with inputs and without (Column (5) and (6)) have similar coe cients, and
the impact of imports is comparable to or greater for sectors that do not have imports.
However, when we turn to the instrumental variable estimations, a di erent issue arises. Our
instrumentation strategy cannot explain trade  ows in the sample containing input goods. Also,
when we add additional instruments, the  rst and second lag of manufacturing growth in LWCs
interacted with labor intensity, in Column (7), or instrument for the change of net imports in
21Column (8), the  rst-stage estimation is not signi cant. Consequently, the second-stage estimation
is weakly identi ed.
In sum, our instrumentation strategy does not predict the intermediate good content of trade
and therefore does not capture the "cost channel" e ect of inputs from China and similar countries,
but rather the pro-competitive e ect of low-wage country imports.
U.S. Markups
The  rst four columns of Table 7 present the relationship between changes in U.S. imports
from nine LWCs and changes in markups and pro ts of domestic U.S.  rms. Panel A displays
the OLS results and Panel B the two-stage least squares estimations. Markups are de ned as
one minus the ratio of variable costs divided by the value of shipments. Column (1) displays the
basic regression for markups, Column (2) adds productivity growth in the U.S. as a control and
Column (3) adds the lagged change in markups as a control. Column (4) presents the baseline
regression for pro ts de ned as one minus total costs over the value of shipments.
The OLS regressions in Panel A suggest that import competition is associated with increasing
markups and pro ts. The sign of the instrumental variable coe cients are of the opposite sign,
although they are again not signi cant. However, it is noteworthy that the sign of the coe cients
are within the right order of magnitude. Consider the baseline estimation including only year
dummies and  xed e ects. In the baseline estimation of Column 5 in Table 3, a 1% increase in
import competition is associated with a 31 percentage point drop in prices. This drop is nearly
fully explained by a 24% increase in productivity and a 035% decrease in markups (see Column
(1) of Tables 4 and 6).
5 Demand Elasticity and the E ect of LWC Trade
The results presented so far highlight the importance of the productivity reshu ing channel of
Melitz (2003) as the main channel through which LWC imports a ect U.S. industry. We next
document that the response of trade volume, prices, and productivity to growth in LWCs varies
across the dimension of the elasticity of substitution as predicted by the Melitz model.
We document that while the response of import volume to output growth in LWCs is much
22more pronounced in sectors with elastic demand, the response of prices and productivity to a
given increase in import volume is much larger in sectors with inelastic demand. While these
di erential responses are present in the short run, they are even more pronounced in the long run.
In Columns (5) to (8) of Table 7, we split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution.
The elasticities we use are estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006), following the methodology
of Feenstra (1994). There are two striking  ndings. First, the response of import volume to
growth in LWCs is much stronger in sectors with elastic demand (see Panel C). This  nding is
intuitive given that we estimate the instantaneous response of import volume to growth in LWC
output capacity. Foreign  rms  nd it easier to penetrate markets with elastic demand.12
Second, for a given change in import volume, the response of prices and productivity is larger
in sectors with inelastic demand (see Panel B). Also this result is intuitive: a given level of import
competition implies a much larger change in pro ts when the elasticity of substitution is low.
Consequently, a much larger crowding out e ect of unproductive  rms occurs.13
We next analyze the time dimension of how imports, prices, and productivity react to growth
in LWCs and we again evaluate whether this reaction is di erent for sectors with di erent demand
elasticities. We are interested in how imports react in the long run to the growth in LWCs. We
are also interested in how prices react in the long run to imports.
In Columns (1) to (5) of Table 8 (see Panel A), we check whether imports react to lagged
growth in LWCs. We begin by adding the lagged manufacturing growth times the average labor
share of the sector in Column (1), and we successively also add the second and third lags in
Columns (2) and (3). Then in the next two columns, we keep the three lags, but we again split
the sample by the median elasticity of demand, which equals 5.55. We  nd that overall, most of
the response of imports to growth in LWC is instantaneous and that also the major di erence in
12Chaney (2008) shows that sectors with inelastic demand o er higher pro ts and, therefore, the additional set
of  rms that start exporting is larger when the elasticity is low. This long-run "distorted-gravity" e ect is absent
in our data.










 rm ’s pro ts in equilibrium are equal to a share of 1	 of revenue minus the  xed costs of operating the business.
When all domestic  rms in the industry lose 1% of their revenue to foreign competitors, ceteris paribus, the
absolute loss in pro ts is the largest in low-elasticity industries. Since the exit rate of unproductive  rms depends
on pro tability, the response of industry to a 1% increase in foreign competition is more pronounced if the elasticity
of demand is low.
23how high- and low-elasticity sectors are a ected by growth is instantaneous.
There is also evidence that imports react with a lag and that this is more pronounced in
sectors with elastic demand. In Columns (3), (4), and (5), the single coe cients for the lags of
LWC growth interacted with labor intensity are not signi cant. However, the joint test that the
sum of the lagged coe cient equals zero cannot be rejected at the 5% level. In addition, a test
that the long-run response of imports di ers for sectors with elastic and inelastic demand cannot
be rejected at the 5% level.
In Columns (6) to (10) of Table 8 (see Panel B), we investigate the long-run response of prices
to growth in LWCs. There are three ways in which prices might be a ected dynamically. Prices
might respond in a staggered way to changes in imports. Second, Columns (1) to (5) document
that the response of trade  ows to growth in LWCs is somewhat staggered, itself. Last, prices
might be autoregressive. We therefore present reduced-form estimations that directly relate our
(lagged) instrument to price changes and we also control for lagged price changes.
In Column (6), we add the  rst lag of our instrument and the lagged price change. We add
the second and third lags in Columns (7) and (8). The estimations reveal that prices display
non-trivial mean reversion. While there is no e ect of the  rst and second lag of LWC growth
on U.S. prices, there is a signi cant e ect of the third lag of the growth in LWCs. In Columns
(3) to (5), we documented that the price response is not the result of imports reacting with a
lag to growth. Consequently, the staggered response of prices to our instrument must be the
consequence of prices reacting with a lag to import competition.
We next split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution in Columns (9) and (10) and
obtain two interesting  ndings. First, the instantaneous response of prices to growth in LWCs is
about the same in sectors with high and low elasticity of substitution. Second, the response is
markedly di erent after three years.
In the reduced-form estimation, prices react strongly to lagged manufacturing growth in in-
elastic sectors. This result cannot be explained by the response of imports to lagged growth (see
Columns (4) and (5) of Panel A), so it must be the long-term response of prices to a given level
of import competition that di ers between sectors with di erent demand structures.
This di erential response of prices in the long term can be rationalized in the context of the
24existing literature. A given level of import competition leads to much greater losses of pro ts in a
sector with inelastic demand. Therefore, the long-term exit of unproductive  rms and consequent
productivity growth is much more pronounced in these sectors.14
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this study, we document that imports from China, Brazil, Indonesia, India, Malaysia, Mexico,
the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam had a pronounced e ect on prices and productivity in
the US.
The main novelty of our empirical strategy is to construct an instrument for trade that is
directly based on comparative advantage. We  rst document that imports from low-wage countries
are concentrated in labor-intensive sectors and that over the last decade, the composition of
imports has remained remarkably stable, while import volume grew strongly. Consequently, the
increase in low-wage import competition was concentrated in labor intensive sectors. We next show
that the relative increase of import competition in labor intensive sectors was most pronounced
in the years when the growth of industrial output in the emerging economies was the highest,
i.e., that the interaction of a sector’s labor intensity and output growth in low-wage countries can
explain changes in import competition in the US.
Second, we demonstrate that the temporary and relative component of imports induced by
labor intensity and output growth in the examined nations is orthogonal to U.S. supply and
demand shocks and can, therefore, be utilized to identify the causal impact of import competition
on prices.
In a panel covering 325 manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006, we  nd that low-wage
import competition had a strong impact on prices and productivity. A baseline estimate is that
when the nine examined nations capture 1% market share in the U.S., producer prices decrease
by 3%, with about three-fourths of this change due to productivity growth and the remainder due
to the reduction of markups. We  nd no evidence that cheap imported intermediate goods lower
14We have no understanding why the di erential e ect occurs exactly after three years rather than smoothly
through time. We have also evaluated longer horizons, but three years is the lag at which the response diverges
across sectors with di erent elasticities.
25U.S prices.
The empirical  ndings based on our instrumentation strategy uncover much stronger e ects of
globalization than is commonly assumed and reverse, for example, the "China does not matter"
verdict reached by Kamin et al. (2006). However, our methodology abstracts from factors such as
the increase in global raw material prices that growth in emerging economies has caused and we
also do not analyze the optimal response of the monetary authority to these relative price shocks.
With these limitations in mind, the aggregate e ect of low wage imports on in ationary our
results suggest is the following. On average from 1997 to 2006, low-wage import competition has
risen by 0.89 percentage points per year in the industries covered in this study and, therefore, the
U.S. PPI in ation rate in manufacturing was reduced due to import competition by nearly 27
percentage points each year, while productivity growth was increased by around two percentage
points.
Although manufacturing prices make up only a fraction of PPI in ation and producer price
in ation is passed through imperfectly to consumers, the aggregate e ect of imports from the
newly developing world surely cannot be neglected.
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29Appendix A: Data Sources
Industrial production (For China, there is no reliable estimate of Manufacturing Production)
China: IMF International Financial Statistics
Manufacturing production: Mexico: IMF International Financial Statistics; The Philippines:
IMF International Financial Statistics; India: Datastream Malaysia: Datastream; Brazil: OECD
Main Economic Indicators; Indonesia: OECD Main Economic Indicators; Canada: OECD Main
Economic Indicators; Germany: OECD Main Economic Indicators; Japan: OECD Main Economic
Indicators; Thailand: Bank of Thailand
Vietnam: General Statistics O ce of Vietnam;
De nition of: Markups
Markup = (Value Added - Total Compensation to Employers)/ Value Shipments
Value Added = Value of Shipments - Cost of Materials, Fuels, Electricity
Markup = (Value of Shipments - Variable Costs)/Value of Shipments
Variable Costs = Cost of Materials, Supplies, Fuels, Electricity+
Total Compensation Paid to Employers
Skill intensity = (number of employees - average number of production workers)/number of em-
ployees
Value Added is compiled by the BLS and also adjusts for changes in inventories, and the income
from merchandise operations.
Data Sources for Figures 1 to 4
Figure 1: United States International Trade Commission; Figure 2: Trade data are from the
United States International Trade Commission. Labor share is from the U.S. Annual Survey of
Manufacturers and is de ned as total compensation of employees divided by total compensation
of employees and total capital expenditures; Figure 3: labor intensity, see Figure 2; Figure 4: Real
capital stock is from B. Bosworth used in Bosworth and Collins (2007). E ective labor supply:
total number of persons employed in China (Asian Development Bank) times real manufacturing
wage growth in China (nominal wage growth from Laborstat database ILO and GDP de ator
from the World Bank Development Indicators).
30Appendix B: List of Outliers
35 NAICS-Year observations were excluded because the absolute year-to-year price change ex-
ceeded 0.25 log points.
 
Year Naics  Sector Names
2003 311212 Rice Milling
1999
2002
1998 312221 Cigarette Manufacturing.
1998, 1999, 2001, 2002, 2004, 2005 324110 Petroleum Refineries
Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing
Plastics Pipe and Pipe Fitting Manufacturing
2004 331111 Iron and Steel Mills
2003, 2004, 2005  331411 Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper.
2006 331419 Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferrous Metal 
2005, 2006 331421 Copper Rolling, Drawing, and Extruding
2004 332311 Prefabricated Metal Building and 
Component Manufacturing
2000 334414 Electronic Capacitor Manufacturing.
Table A - Observations with Absolute Change of Ln Price > 0.25 
2004 331222 Steel Wire Drawing
2004 331112 Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Product Manufacturing
2005 326122
2000 327420 Gypsum Product Manufacturing
2004 325211 Plastics Material and Resin Manufacturing
325311 2000, 2001, 2003 
2004 325181 Alkalies and Chlorine Manufacturing
2005 325182 Carbon Black Manufacturing
2003 321219 Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing
2004 325110 Petrochemical Manufacturing
2003 321212 Softwood Veneer and Plywood Manufacturing
311512 Creamery Butter Manufacturing
1998, 2003, 2004 311613 Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing
31Appendix C Sample Criterion
The sample criterion for the nine LWCs in this study is the following. We de ne a nation to
be "low-wage" if it’s non-PPP adjusted GDP per capita in 2005 is less than 20% of U.S. income
per capita. There are 133 LWCs for which we have both trade and GDP (per capita) information
(source: World Bank Development Indicators), but most of these countries account for only a very
small fraction of U.S. imports. Furthermore, most countries do not publish reliable information
about their manufacturing output. We thus drop all countries that account for less than 04% of
U.S. imports in 2005.T h e r ea r e17 remaining economies that have less than 20% of U.S. GDP
per capita and account for more than 04% of U.S. world imports. We next exclude all countries
where raw materials account for more than 30% of U.S. imports. We next exclude all countries
where raw materials account for more than 30% of U.S. imports.15 The latter criterion excludes
Angola, Algeria, Chile, Colombia, Iraq, Nigeria, the Russian Federation, and Venezuela.
In total, we end up with nine countries that account for 87% of U.S. non-raw material imports
from LWCs. They are China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Thai-
land, and Vietnam. In 2005, these nine countries accounted for 37% of non-raw material U.S.
imports and for 32% of all U.S. imports.
How would altering the criterion a ect our sample? Changing the cut-o  of a "low-wage"
country to 10% of U.S. GDP per capita excludes Brazil, Mexico, and Malaysia. Altering the level
at which a country is dropped from our data set because it exports mostly raw materials has no
big e ect on the composition of our sample. We would include Chile if the cut o  is higher than
35%, and the next country to be included is Colombia if the cut o  is above 59%.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
Mexico has the highest raw material import share of the included countries at 16%.L a s t , i f
we also include countries with less than 04% of total U.S. imports, this adds a large number
of countries, yet only very little trade volume. For example, lowering the cut-o  to 03% would
add only Turkey, and lowering it to 02% would also add the Dominican Republic, Argentina,
Honduras, Costa Rica, and Pakistan. These additional countries, in total, account for only 15%
of U.S. imports and 38% of non-raw material imports from LWCs.
15Raw material imports are de ned as the sum of imports in sectors (Harmonized System) 27 (mineral fuels),
7106, 7108, 7110, 74, 7502, 7601, 7801, 7901, and 8001 (di erent unwrought metals).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
US Imports originating from China  China  China  Mexico India Vietnam Canada Japan Japan China
Panel Estimation with  RE, w/o year  FE, w/o year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year  FE, with year
 dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies  dummies
Dependent Variable
Labor Share  -0.051
[0.016]**
Growth Industrial Production -0.445 -0.447
 in China [0.093]** [0.093]**
Growth Ind. Prod. China * 0.665 0.668 0.667
Labor Share  [0.108]** [0.108]** [0.107]**
Growth Manufact. Mexico * 0.121
Labor Share  [0.044]**
Growth Manufact. Mexico * 0.062
Labor Share  [0.022]**
Growth Manufact. Vietnam * 0.052
Labor Share  [0.014]**
Growth Manufact. Canada * 0.021
Labor Share  [0.053]
Growth Manufact. Japan * 0.078
Labor Share  [0.052]
Growth Manufact. Japan * 0.210
Skill Intensity [0.036]**
Growth Ind. Prod. China * 0.049
Skill Intensity [0.076]
F i x e d  E f f e c t s   ny yyyyyyyy
Y e a r  D u m m i e s nn yyyyyyyy
Observations 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890 2890
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
R-Squared  (within) 0.082 0.087 0.106 0.031 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.046 0.057 0.092
Dependent variable is the y/y absolute change of (Country Imports / ( US Industry Size+World Imports)) 
Table 1 - Growth of Manufacturing Output, Factor Intensity, and Imports (Panel Estimations)
Notes: Sample is 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997to 2006 (311111-339999).Table 1 presents the relation between the growth of manufacturing output in several nations, factor 
intensity and growth of U.S. imports. The countries covered are China (Columns (1), (2), (3), and (10)), Mexico in Column (4), India in Column  (5), Vietnam in Column  (6), Canada in Column 
(7), and Japan in Columns (8) and (9). The dependent variable is the year to year in the level of Import from the respective country divided by the U.S. industry size. U.S. Industry Size is defined as 
the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus total imports in the respective industry.  An industry is measured at the 6-digit NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). All specifications 
except (1) and (2) include year dummies, and all specifications except (1) include fixed effects (FE) by industry; * significantat 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Estimation: OLS OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
Dependent Variable
Ch. Imports LWC 0.634 0.504 -1.039 0.147 -0.552 0.357 -0.487
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.122]** [0.144]** [2.199] [0.130] [1.924] [0.043]** [0.710]
Within R-Square 0.03 0.14 0.1 0.16
Labor Share * Ch. % LWC   0.601 0.601 0.601
Manfct. Output [0.227]** [0.227]** [0.227]**
fixed effects n y y y y y y
Year dummies (both stages) n y y y y y y
Observations 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845 1845
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
R-Square (first stage within) - - 0.08 - 0.08 - 0.08
Table 2 – Examining the Identifying Restriction (Panel Estimations)
Panel B: First-Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (Imports LWC / U.S. industry Size)
Non-LWC Consumption U.S. Production Non-LWC Imports
Panel A: OLS or 2nd Stage - Dep. Var. is the y/y Change of:
Notes: Sample is 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111-339999). Table 2 presents the relation between LWC on the one 
and U.S. non-LWC consumption, U.S. domestic shipments, and U.S. non-LWC imports one the other side. non-LWC imports are equal to all U.S imports 
minus the imports from the nine LWCs. In Columns 1 to 3, the dependent variable is the year-to-year change of (Domestic Production & non-LWC 
imports / Avg. U.S. Industry Size). In Columns 4 and 5, the dependent variable is the year-to-year change of (Domestic Production / Avg. U.S. Industry 
Size). In Columns 6 and 7, the dependent variable is the year-to-year change of (non-LWC imports / Avg. U.S. Industry Size). Columns 1,2, 4, and 6 
present OLS estimation results, while Columns 3, 5, and 7 present two-stage least squares results. The first stage is reported in Panel B. Avg. U.S. Industry 
Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus total imports in the respective industry.  An industry is measured at the 6-digit 
NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). All specifications except (1) include year dummies and fixed effects (FE) by industry; * significant at 5%; 
** significant at 1% 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
w/o year Incl. LWC  with Year Incl. LWC  with Year
dummies Manfct. Growth Dummies Manfct. Growth Dummies
Estimation: OLS OLS OLS IV IV
Ch. Imports LWC 0.232 0.048 -0.009 -3.112 -3.097
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.047]** [0.047] [0.047] [0.733]** [0.710]**
Ch. % LWC Manfacturing 0.508 1.269
Output [0.038]** [0.187]**
Within R-Square 0.01 0.08 0.11
Labor Share * Ch. % LWC   1.070 1.073
Manfct. Output [0.200]** [0.197]**
Ch. % LWC Manfacturing -0.675
Output [0.172]**
Year dummies (both stages) n n y n y
Observations 2667 2667 2667 2667 2667
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325
R-Square (first stage within) - - - 0.10 0.12
Panel B: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (Imports LWC / U.S. industry Size)
Table 3 - LWC Imports and U.S. Prices: OLS and IV Results (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations) 
Panel A: OLS or 2nd Stage - Dep. Var. is the y/y Ln-change U.S. Producer Price
Notes: Sampleis 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111-339999). Panel A of Table 2 displays the relation 
between changes of imports from nine LWCs and U.S. Producer Prices. The dependent variable is the annual change in the logarithmof 
U.S. producer price at the 6-digit NAICS level (only manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolutecha nge  
in (LWC Imports/US Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. 
In Columns (2) and (4), "Ch. % LWC Manfct." is the weighted growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. In the lower Panel 
B the first-stage relation is displayed and the instrument is the sectoral labor intensity times Ch. % LWC Manufacturing output.All  
estimations include fixed effects by sector; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Lagged Lagged Ch. Adding Lagged Adding Including Changes in Chinese
LWC imports LWC Imports PPI Changes Productivity  Outliers NET  Imports Imports
Ch. Imports LWC 0.006 0.036 0.034 -0.030 0.131
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.047] [0.051] [0.051] [0.050] [0.064]*
Ch. NET Imports LWC -0.092
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.042]*
Ch. Imports China -0.108
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.061]
Instrumented Ch. Imports LWC -3.276 -2.234 -2.249 -3.463 -5.788
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.832]** [0.653]** [0.633]** [0.842]** [1.269]**
Instrumented Ch. NET Imports  -2.818
LWC (i n % of US Industry Size)  [0.643]**
Instrumented Ch. Imports -3.516
China (i n % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.701]**
Lag 1 of Imports LWC 0.061
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.052]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports 0.122
 LWC (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.083]
Lag 1 of Sectoral Inflation (PPI) -0.019
[0.025]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.037
[0.025]
Imports LWC Imports LWC Imports LWC Imports LWC Imports LWC NET Imp. LWC Imports China
Labor Share * Ch.% LWC  0.962 1.059 1.104 1.03 1.007 1.18
Manfacturing Output [0.199]** [0.213]** [0.216]** [0.212]** [0.190]** [0.222]**
Labor Share * Ch. %  Chinese 0.755
Manfacturing Output [0.116]**
Lag 1 of Imports LWC 0.035
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.010]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports LWC 0.066
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.021]**
Lag 1 of Sectoral Inflation (PPI) 0.003
[0.008]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.015
[0.005]**
Observations 2667 2381 2345 2279 2702 2667 2667
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
R-Square (first stage within) 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12 0.06 0.11
Table 4 - LWC Imports and U.S. Prices (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies) 
Panel C: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Change of 
Panel B: IV Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Ln-change of the 6-Digit NAICS U.S. Producer Price
Panel A: OLS estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Ln-change of the 6-Digit NAICS U.S. Producer Price
Notes: Sampleis 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111- 339999). All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies. Panels A 
and B of Table 3 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine LWCs and U.S. producer prices. Panel A displays the OLS results, Panel B the two-stage 
least-squares estimations, and Panel C the first stage estimation. The dependent variable is the annual change in the logarithm of U.S. producer prices at the 6-digit NAICS 
level (manufacturing industries). "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-
2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Imports LWC" in (1) is normalized by the U.S. industry size. "Ch.% L WC M anufacturin g Ou tp ut" is  th e 
weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LWC (or Chinese in (7)) manufacturing 
output. "Productivity" in (4) is the 4-, 5-, 6-digit NAICS productivity growth from the BLS; * significant at 5%; ** significanta t  1 %
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Basic  Lagged Lagged Ch. Adding Lagged Adding Including Changes in Chinese
Specification LWC imports LWC Imports PPI Changes Productivity  Outliers NET Imports Imports
Ch. Imports LWC 0.323 0.329 0.424 0.412 0.331 0.362
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.101]** [0.101]** [0.116]** [0.118]** [0.101]** [0.099]**
Ch. NET Imports LWC -0.012
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.089]
Ch. Imports China 0.236
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.129]
Lag 1 of Imports LWC -0.034
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.060]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports  LWC -0.13
 (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.117]
Lag 1 of Sectoral -0.109
 Inflation (PPI) [0.041]**
Lag 1 U.S. Productivity -0.140
 Growth [0.022]**
Instrumented Ch. Imports  2.375 2.759 2.043 1.743 2.180 2.051
LWC (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [1.022]* [1.201]* [1.122] [1.052] [0.960]* [1.003]*
Instrumented Ch. NET Impt. 2.243
 LWC (in % of US Industry Size)  [1.012]*
Instrumented Ch. Imports 0.407
China (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.986]
Lag 1 of Imports LWC -0.183
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.100]
Lag 1 of Ch. Imports  LWC -0.243
 (in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.147]
Lag 1 of Sectoral -0.107
 Inflation (PPI) [0.043]*
Lag 1 U.S. Productivity -0.140
Growth [0.024]**
Observations 2317 2317 2031 1957 2279 2350 2317 2317
Sectors 325 325 325 325 325 325 325 325
Table 5 - LWC Imports and U.S. Productivity (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel B: IV Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y US Productivity Growth (BLS)
Panel A: OLS estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y US Productivity Growth (BLS)
Notes:  Sampleis 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111- 339999). Table 4 presents the relation between changes in U.S. imports from nine 
LWCs and the 4, 5, or 6-digit NAICS annual productivity growth from the BLS. Panel A displays the OLS estimation results and Panel B the two-stage least squares 
results. "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of 
U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Imports LWC," "Imports China," and "Net imports LWC" are normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing 
Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LWC (or Chinese in 
(8)) manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies. For First Stage see Panel B of Table 3 (except Column (5)); * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cost of  Parts=1
Basic Product ivty Lagged Wage Inputs Basic 3 Instruments Net Imports
Hourly Wage Hourly Wage Hourly Wage Inputs/ Revenue  Producer Price Producer Price Producer Price Producer Price
Ch. Imports LIC -0.141 -0.148 -0.167 -0.039 -0.032 0.017 0.017
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.079] [0.079] [0.092] [0.121] [0.081] [0.039] [0.039]
Ch. NET Imports LIC -0.003
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.033]
Ch. Imports LIC 1.754 1.711 1.896 -2.141 -2.339
(in % of US Industry Size)  [1.365] [1.442] [1.434] [2.133] [0.561]**
Ch. NET Imports LIC
(in % of U.S. Industry Size) 
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.008
[0.027]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Wage -0.319
[0.034]**
Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC Imports LIC NET Imp. LIC
Labor Share * Ch.% LIC  0.601 0.568 0.627 0.585 1.479 -0.510 -0.803 0.252
Manfacturing Output [0.227]** [0.227]* [0.237]** [0.304] [0.218]** [0.501] [0.604] [0.582]
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch.%  1.096
 LIC Manfacturing Output [0.557]*
Lagf 2 Labor Share * Ch.% 0.093
 LIC Manfacturing Output [0.525]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.011
[0.006]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Wage -0.007
[0.009]
Observations 1843 1843 1521 1142 1116 1116 999 1116
Sectors 325 325 325 289 138 138 138 138
R-Square (first stage)  0.08 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.04
Not Displayed: Estimations Include Controls of Panel B
Panel B: IV Estimates 
(6) to (8) weakly identified
Panel A: First Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y Change of:
Table 6 - LWC Imports, Wages, and Input Costs (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Production Worker Wage Parts =0
Sample: Six Digit NAICS Manufacturing Industries from 97-06 (311111- 3399999)
Dependent Variable (Panel B and C) is the Ln Change of:
Panel C: OLS estimates
Notes: Sample is 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111-339999) . Panels A and B of Table 6 presents the relation between changes in U.S. 
imports from nine LICs and changes in production worker wages, cost of inputs, or producer prices. Panel A displays the OLS results, Panel B the two-stage least-squares 
estimations,and Panle C the first-stage estimations . Worker wage is defined as total wage payments to production workers divided by the total amount of hours worked. 
Input Costs is defined as the ratio of the cost of inputs over turnover (domestic shipments). Columns (5) to (8) examine the role of intermediate inputs. Column (5) only 
includes sectors which do not include any 10-digit HS goods code containing the words "Parts," "Input," or related acronyms and a non-zero trade flow. Columns (6) to 
(8) contain only these sectors. The second-stage estimation in (6) to (8) is not displayed since the estimation is weakly identified. "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the 
y/y absolute change in (LWC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Net 
imports LWC" is normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. 
The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LWC manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies; * significant at 
5%; ** significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Profits
Basic Productivty  Lag. Markup per Revenue Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55
1+ Markup 1+ Markup 1+ Markup Profits
Ch. Imports LWC 0.161 0.141 0.193 0.864 0.052 0.025 0.452 0.278
(in % of U.S. Industry Size)  [0.046]** [0.045]** [0.055]** [0.342]* [0.092] [0.055] [0.192]* [0.125]*
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.084
[0.010]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.250
[0.029]**
Ch. Imports LWC -0.339 -0.842 -0.622 -5.426 -8.65 -1.516 5.692 1.493
(in % of US Industry Size)  [0.704] [0.807] [0.777] [5.503] [3.843]* [0.504]** [3.346] [1.008]
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.096
[0.015]**
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.254
[0.031]**
Labor Share * Ch.% LWC 0.601 0.568 0.634 1.018 0.490 1.61 0.488 1.490
Manfacturing Output [0.227]** [0.227]* [0.237]** [0.184]** [0.204]* [0.335]** [0.205]* [0.364]**
U.S. Productivity Growth 0.011
[0.006]
Lag 1 of Ch. Ln. Markup -0.004
[0.015]
Observations 1843 1843 1521 2890 1333 1334 1159 1158
Sectors 325 325 325 325 162 163 162 163
R-Square (first stage) 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.16 0.12 0.15
Table 7 - LWC Imports, Markups, and Elasticity of Demand (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel B: IV Estimates 
Dep. Var is  Ch. Ln. Price Dep. Var is  Ch. Ln. Productivity
Panel C: First-Stage Estimation - Dep. Var. is the y/y change in (Imports LWC / U.S. industry Size)
Markup
Dependent Variable (Panel A and B) is the Ln Change of:
Panel A: OLS estimates
Producer Price Productivity
Notes: Sample is 6-digit NAICS manufacturing industries from 1997 to 2006 (311111-339999). Columns (1) to (4) of Table 7 presents the relation between changes in 
U.S. imports from nine LWCs and changes in markups, profits, prices, and productivity. Panel A displays the OLS estimates, Panel B the two-stage least-squares 
estimates and Panel C the first-stage estimates. Markups are defined as one minus the ratio variable costs over the value of shipments and profits are defined as one 
minus total costs over the value of shipments. Columns (5) to (8) split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution (5.55). The elasticity of each six-digit NAICS 
sector is the unweighted average of the underlying HS 10 elasticities from Broda and Weinstein (2006). "Ch. Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in 
(LWC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 1997-2006 average value of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Net imports LWC" is 
normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument 
employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LWC manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed effects by sector and year dummies; * significant at 5%; ** 
significant at 1%
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Lag1  Lags 1-2 Lags 1-3 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55 Sigma <5.55 Sigma>5.55
Labor Share * Ch.  1.006 1.091 1.100 0.671 1.487
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.184]** [0.206]** [0.226]** [0.259]** [0.363]**
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch. 0.287 0.262 0.167 -0.227 0.537
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.177] [0.189] [0.235] [0.266] [0.383]
Lag 2 Labor Share * Ch. 0.351 0.411 0.161 0.612
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.176]* [0.200]* [0.232] [0.320]
Lag 3 Labor Share * Ch. -0.053 -0.326 0.207
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.238] [0.274] [0.382]
Labor Share * Ch.  -2.452 -2.525 -2.489 -2.671 -2.297
% LWC Manfct. Output   [0.504]** [0.495]** [0.544]** [0.805]** [0.734]**
Lag 1 Labor Share * Ch. -0.124 0.389 -0.192 0.477 -0.858
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.472] [0.511] [0.572] [0.844] [0.779]
Lag 2 Labor Share * Ch. -0.363 -0.102 -0.295 0.111
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.470] [0.527] [0.787] [0.706]
Lag 3 Labor Share * Ch. -1.768 -3.027 -0.742
% LWC Manfct. Output [0.661]** [0.995]** [0.890]
Lag 1 Ch. PPI Price -0.026 -0.058 -0.088 -0.08 -0.095
[0.018] [0.019]** [0.022]** [0.032]* [0.030]**
Lag 2 Ch. PPI Price -0.112 -0.139 -0.109 -0.157
[0.019]** [0.022]** [0.033]** [0.029]**
Lag 3 Ch. PPI Price -0.03 -0.041 -0.033
[0.023] [0.035] [0.031]
Year dummies  y y y y y y y y y y
Observations 2890 2568 2245 1129 1116 2345 2021 1700 851 849
Sectors 325 325 325 163 162 325 325 289 146 143
R-Square (within) 0.12 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.14 - - - - -
Table 8 - The Long-Run Response of U.S. Prices (Fixed Effects Panel Estimations with Year Dummies)
Panel A:  First-Stage Estimation - Dependent Variable is the y/y change of Imports LWC / US industry Size
Panel B: Reduced Form Estimates - Dependent Variable is the y/y Change of Ln U.S. Price PPI
(6) - (8) all sectors
Notes: Sample is 6-digit NAICS  manufacturing industries from 1997to 2006 (311111-339999). Table 8 displays the long-run effect of LWC trade on  LWC imports and U.S. prices. 
Panel A presents the first-stage estimation relating LWC output growth to LWC imports and Panel B presents the results relating imports or growth in LWCs to U.S. prices. In Panel A, 
Columns (1) to (5), the estimation adds lagged values of the interaction of LWC growth and labor intensity directly to prices. Columns (5) to (10) display reduced-form estimations that 
relate the (lagged) interaction of LWC growth and labor intensity directly to prices.  Columns (4), (5), (9), and (10) split the sample by the median elasticity of substitution (5.55). 
Elasticities are from Broda and Weinstein (2006). "Ch.Imports LWC" is defined as the y/y absolute change in (LWC Imports/U.S. Industry Size). U.S. Industry Size is defined as the 
1997-2006 average val ue of U.S. shipments plus world imports. Also "Net imports LWC" is normalized by U.S. industry size. "Ch. % LWC Manufacturing Output" is the weighted 
average growth rate of manufacturing output in the nine LWCs. The instrument employed is the labor intensity times Ch. % LWC manufacturing output. All estimations include fixed 
effects by sector and year dummies; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
40Figure 1: Share of Low-Wage Country Imports 1989 to 2006
Notes: Source is United States International Trade Commission.
41Figure 2
Notes: Labor intensity is de ned as the ratio of the 1997 to 2006 average of labor expenditures over labor plus capital
expenditures. Labor share is from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturers and is de ned as total compensation
of employees divided by total compensation of employees and total capital expenditures.
42Figure 3: Average Labor Intensity of U.S. Imports
Notes: The seven low-wage countries are Brazil, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam.
Labor intensity is de ned as the ratio of the 1997 to 2006 average of labor expenditures over labor plus capital
expenditures. Labor share is from the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturers and is de ned as total compensation
of employees divided by total compensation of employees and total capital expenditures.
43Figure 4: Factor Supply in China 1996 to 2004
Notes: Real capital stock is from B. Bosworth used in Bosworth and Collins (2007). E ective labor supply equals
the total number of persons employed in China (Asian Development Bank) times real manufacturing wage growth
in China (nominal wage growth from Laborstat database ILO and GDP de ator from the World Bank Development
Indicators).
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